For a global analysis of the balance of forces between the classes

The original of this article is in French.

Below, we publish our contribution on the first item on the agenda of the second international meeting of the groups and elements of the Communist Left**: the analysis of the balance of forces between the classes, the state and composition of the proletariat, the impact of the structural and geographical evolutions of capitalism, and so on :

SUMMARY

• The shift of capitalism’s centre of gravity (towards Asia in particular).
• Towards a global appreciation of the class balance of forces.
• Is there an ’historical awakening of the class struggle’ (ICC)?
• Appendix

** More information on this second meeting, which brought together comrades from the USA, France, England, Italy, Sweden and Holland, will appear soon, both on our website and on those of other participants (Internationalist Perspective, Battaglia Comunista, Groupe Révolutionnaire Internationaliste, Old Moles, A Free Retriever’s Digest). As for the first meeting, readers may refer to our report in n°7 of our Controverses magazine (in French) as well as a first response to a ’critique-diatribe’ in n°3 of our Cahier Thématique, pages 56 to 63 (in French).

Shifting capitalism’s centre of gravity

For a Marxist, an analysis of the class struggle can only be developed on a global scale. However, we must recognise that there are three major detrimental delays in understanding within the Communist Left:

• On the shift of capitalism’s centre of gravity towards Asia in particular.
• On a good understanding of capitalist development in Asia.
• And, on a virtual lack of appreciation of the class struggle in this region [1].

This shift of capitalism’s centre of gravity is spectacular if we compare the evolution of the share of the ’historical’ developed countries with that of the emerging + developing countries, calculated in purchasing power parity [2]:

Graph 1 : Distribution of world GDP by major zones

This geographical shift of capitalism’s centre of gravity mainly concerns Asia, where the economic dynamic has overtaken that of the West in terms of GDP (Graph 2) :

Graph 2: Share in world GDP between Asia, the West and the rest of the world.

This shift is even more spectacular if we focus on manufacturing production alone: only a quarter of a century ago, the G7 still accounted for two-thirds of manufacturing production, against one-tenth in Asia, whereas today the G7 accounts for only half (one-third in 2024), against more than 40% in Asia:

Graph 3 : Share of world manufacturing output: Blue = G7: US, Canada, Japan, GER, UK, France, Italy; Orange = I6: China, India, South Korea, Thailand, Brazil; Black = rest of the world

As a result, not only has the heart of capitalism moved to Asia, but so have the main strongholds of the world proletariat since 3/5ths of the manufacturing proletariat working on assembly lines are found there ... and the Communist Left has not yet taken the full measure of this, either economically or politically and even less so socially!!!!

Towards a global appreciation of the class balance of forces

Therefor, assessing the state of the class balance of forces at world level requires, at the very least, an analysis of the state of the class struggle in Asia! And this analysis is important for two reasons: to appreciate the capacity of the proletariat to make revolution at world level, but also to appreciate its capacity to resist a war recruitment, from both Beijing and Washington. Below, we put forward some general characteristics which should play a part in this assessment. Still too lapidary, they need to be completed and critically discussed.

POSITIVE factors:

* As well as being numerically large and young, the proletariat in Asia is also highly concentrated, unlike anything we have seen in the West ... think of the 450,000 employees at the Foxconn industrial site in Shenzhen!
* It’s also an essentially manufacturing proletariat, working on assembly lines, which has only slightly been affected by the tertiarisation-fragmentation phenomenon.
* If the scant information available is to be believed, it is also a proletariat which is still combative (Graphs 4 & 5) and which has not been affected by the profound decline of the Western proletariat over the last half-century (Graph 6).
* Finally, the working class in Asia is much better educated and concentrated and lives in a much more developed society than that of Russia in October 1917 (where the proletariat was a minority in a society that was still largely agricultural).

NEGATIVE factors:

* The proletariat in Asia has little historical experience and still has many illusions about democracy, ’free’ trade unions, the pursuit of economic prosperity..., particularly in China, but not only.

Nevertheless, our feeling is that, despite these undeniable negative factors, they do not wipe out the enormous revolutionary potential of this industrial proletariat, which is numerous, concentrated, educated and combative. As in the case of the proletariat in Russia in 1917, its youth and the lack of influence of a reformist social democracy, as in the West, could even make it an asset. Admittedly, this fraction of the world proletariat will need the contribution of the experiences of its historical sectors (just as the revolution in Russia needed its extension in the West), but its weaknesses must not be overestimated.

Graph 4: Strikes in China - 1978-2013

Graph 5 : Number of strikes in China - 2011-2023

The geo-economic and imperialist tilting of the world around the China-USA bipolarisation confers a new responsibility on the proletariat of these two great powers, all the more so as the proletariat in Europe has suffered a profound retreat of more than half a century (Graph 6) [3]. What’s more, this ’historic’ proletariat of Western Europe finds itself terribly weakened and in a less central position than before, squeezed as it is, economically, socially and politically, between these two powers, the United States and China. On the other hand, the proletariat of these two superpowers is characterised by two historical weaknesses: (1) although for different reasons, it is bathed in a viscerally ’anti-communist’ atmosphere and (2) it has historically contributed little to the international workers’ movement.

Graph 6 : Strikes in 16 developed countries [4]

Is there a ’historical awakening of the class struggle’ - ICC?

The consequences of the pandemic period (shortages, unemployment, etc.) relayed by those of the war in Ukraine (inflation, etc.) gave impetus to a surge in class struggles in several countries, a surge that markedly contrasted with the social calm of the previous four or five decades (Graph 6). This upsurge was particularly marked in the United Kingdom, both in terms of duration and intensity (graph 7), and much less so in other countries (see appendix). But can we reasonably speak of a historical revival of the class struggle at international level, as the ICC defends [5]?

Graph 7 : Working days lost due to strike action - UK

Certainly NOT ... for the following reasons: This upsurge was limited to only a few countries and it gradually ran out of steam [6]. What’s more, if we take a step back in time, it has to be said that the scale of the movement is relatively small, as shown in the graph above for the country where this upsurge was strongest and longest: the United Kingdom. Finally, in the few other countries cited by the ICC, this increase is either non-existent or barely noticeable (see appendix).

The modest and limited nature of this upsurge in social fever is understandable when we consider the length and depth of the half-century retreat in social conflict and the ideological disorientation it has caused. This retreat means that the working class is starting from a much lower base, with fewer points of support than ever before: little awareness of a common collective interest in a perspective beyond immediate demands; no or very little tendency to take charge and self-organise struggles; no clear and shared awareness of the situation and the forces at play; a profound loss of the lessons of past experience which is reflected in a renewed confidence in the unions and even in the political forces of the left; no programme or project, however vague; lilliputian and fragmented revolutionary organisations which are content to harp on old obsolete software... Worse still, a lot of illusions and disorientation have accumulated, the result of decades of capitalist ideological bludgeoning, and there is no longer any form of pre-existing organisational mediation whatsoever. Given the nature of the setback we’ve experienced over the last half-century, if large-scale struggles were to arise in the West, they would have the enormous task of rebuilding from almost nothing. Everything will have to be worked out on the spot, in movement, with very weak and theoretically unprepared political forces.

And of all these things it lacks, the most decisive and undoubtedly the most difficult are: for the proletariat to reappropriate its class identity, for a project and programme commensurate with the present historical situation to be drawn up and disseminated, and for vanguards capable of analysing and carrying forward these perspectives to emerge - which is still very far from being the case, unfortunately!

C.Mcl, June 2024.

Appendix: in its press, the ICC cites countries other than the UK that would be marked by this international resumption of class fights: USA, France, Germany, Spain, Mexico.... What is the reality? All the existing data formally contradicts the ICC’s assertions and confirms our conclusions:

• USA: Neither the year 2023, nor even less 2022, attest to the existence of a resumption of class fights (Graph 8).
• France: The year 2022 does not indicate any resumption in contrast to previous years (Graph 9).
• Germany: If the ICC wants to defend the idea of a resumption of struggles in this country, it must take it back to the beginning of the 2010s and not to the summer of 2022 (Graph 10)!
• Spain: The 2008 economic crisis and the 2012 labour reform aimed at making the labour market more flexible have led to two small spikes in social conflict in Spain (Graph 11). The arrival of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 will lead to a sharp reduction in strikes, while inflation following the war in Ukraine will restore social conflict in Spain to its 1990-2020 average (Graph 12).
• Mexico: the country’s National Statistics Institute (INEGI) reports that in 2023 there was a 43% drop in industrial disputes!

In other words, as usual, the ICC mistakes its desires for reality because it gives precedence to its ideological schemata over the facts, as we developed in our Thematic Paper n°3 (in French), in which it is shown that this organisation is indeed a crystallisation of the idealist pole within the Communist Left.

Graph 8 : USA - Annual number of strikers

Graph 9 : France - Number of days not worked due to strike action

 
Graph 10 : Germany - Nbr of companies affected by strikes (1993 to 2022).

Graph 11 : Spain - Number of strikes in Spain - 2000-2023

Graphe 12 : Espagne - Number of strikes - 1977-2016